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first systematic attempt to empirically evaluate this unique compensation mechanism. Through the lens of scholarship on judiciary-legislature relations, as developed in the United States and in
Israel, this study investigates the role of lower courts adjudicating
the politically-charged tort cases of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
Employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, the Study
utilizes content analysis of 245 decisions rendered by Israeli trial
courts between 1992 and 2012, supplemented by in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders. While scholars tend to focus on
the interests of, and power struggles between, legislatures and supreme courts, this Article studies the relationship between law and
politics in lower courts. It explores changes in the attitudes of
courts towards Palestinians' tort claims against Israel, revealing the
power dynamic between the Israeli legislature and civil trial courts.
The Study shows a judicial attempt to defend lower courts' institutional independence despite the legislature's efforts to dictate a
specifically desired judicial decision-making process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the three democratic branches has
long troubled scholars from various disciplines. Specifically,
scholars have struggled with defining the nature of the complex relations between courts and legislatures, in trying to understand
how judicial decision-making, and consequently, the law itself, are
affected by this dynamic. Much of the dialogueat times battlebetween these entities takes place through the process of legislation and statutory interpretation, turning this domain into fertile
ground for the study of these institutional relations. Unfortunately, most of the work done towards the purpose of explaining this
relationship and its bearing on the law has focused on supreme
courts. As a result of this scholarly focus, while we seem to have
some sense of what it means for a Supreme Court justice to act strategically, this is less clear for lower court judges. Yet, if we are interested in what constrains courts in their decision-making process
and in the impact of the relations between the branches on statutory interpretation, studying the lower courts is of much importance.1
The complexity of the relationship between courts and legislatures on the one hand, and the scarcity of meaningful analysis of
lower courts’ interaction with legislatures on the other hand, created the motivation for this Study. The main objective of this Study
is to examine how lower courts react to a legislative change, aimed
at altering their case law by confining their judicial discretion. In
order to delve into this question, the research undertakes a case
study situated at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (hereinafter, also “the Conflict”), a politically-charged backdrop which
serves as an intriguing setting for investigating the relations between the legislature and the judiciary. The Study looks at tort
claims filed by Palestinian civilians against the State of Israel (“the
State”) due to damages sustained from actions of the Israeli Military (“IDF”). The regulation of this issue was subject to a signifiSee Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously 265 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory
Working
Papers,
Paper
21,
Vol.
4,
No.
2,
2006),
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/21
[https://perma.cc/3W9T-GYS4]
(“Undoubtedly there are reasons to study the Supreme Court. It is a central policymaking institution in American government. Yet, for many of the questions being
asked by scholars, studying the lower courts may make more sense.”).
1
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cant legislative change in 2002, which placed substantial hurdles in
the path of Palestinians seeking remedy from Israel, and confined
courts’ discretion in deciding these sensitive claims. Yet, this important domain has been understudied, from a purely legal perspective and especially from a socio-legal point of view. It thus
constitutes an ideal setting to apply the literature on judiciarylegislature relations to the context of lower courts adjudicating politically-charged cases in the face of a legislative change.
To this end, the Study conducts an empirical examination of
trial court decisions in these cases.2 Through content analysis of
245 court decisions rendered between 1992 and 2012,3 supplemented by several in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders, the
research explores changes that occurred in the attitudes of trial
court judges towards the disputes in question, in reaction to the restrictive, anti-plaintiff legislation and the political climate in Israel.
The methodology of this Study was designed to deal with the
complexity of empirically studying judicial decision-making. By
employing both quantitative and qualitative content analyses, it attempts to capture various aspects of judicial opinions. Additionally, interviews conducted as part of this Study provide social and
political context which is not always reflected in court decisions
themselves.
Based on these sources of data, this Study reveals the power
2 The decision to focus on trial courts rather than appellate courts resulted
from the nature of the research questions. First, because one of the goals of this
Study was to examine the way courts approach said cases, from both a legal and a
factual perspective, it was vital to zoom in on the first instance, where the facts are
discussed in full, rather than examining whether the fact-finder had erred in its
original decision. Second, this choice also relied on the accepted notion that trial
courts and appellate courts exercise their discretion differently, particularly due to
the fact that trial courts can receive a direct impression of the characteristics of the
parties, their versions, and the injuries sustained. This had great significance for
this Study, which aimed to examine the way trial courts respond in their decisions
to plaintiffs’ features.
3 The Study analyzed court decisions published in the “Nevo” commercial
database (a total of 245 decisions). “Nevo” was chosen as it is used by the Israeli
Supreme Court, most leading law firms, and the Israeli Ministry of Justice (comparable to “LexisNexis”). In order to control for errors that may exist in this database and to ensure that all published cases would be examined, the Author conducted searches in two other commercial databases (“Takdin” and “Pad’or”),
used to a lesser degree in Israel. Cases were retrieved from both the magistrate
and the district courts dockets because both levels adjudicate claims at first instance. The time frame for the Research was defined as ten years before and after
the 2002 Amendment, which was enacted in August 2002.
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dynamic between the Israeli legislature and the lower courts adjudicating the difficult tort cases of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
The Study shows a judicial attempt to defend lower courts’ institutional independence and preserve a discretionary space for deciding cases, despite the legislature’s efforts to control judges’ decision-making process.
Section 2 begins by setting out the relevant legal and historical background regarding Palestinians’ tort claims against Israel
for damages inflicted by IDF. Section 3 proceeds with a review of
the relevant scholarship, both American and Israeli, on the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. Section 4 is devoted to a quantitative content analysis of the decisions in question. This Section describes some of the prominent characteristics
of the claims, and compares decision-making patterns before and
after the legislative change of 2002. Section 5 then provides a
deeper look into issues invoked by the quantitative analysis, focusing on areas of judicial decision-making in which courts enjoy considerable discretion. Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings of the
Study, suggests inferences to derive from it, and raises questions
for further research.
2. BACKGROUND: FROM POLITICAL TURMOIL TO ANTI-PLAINTIFFS
LEGISLATION
The complex reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict creates
frequent confrontations between Israel’s security forces, particularly the IDF,4 on the one hand, and Palestinian residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (“OPT”)5 on the other hand. These
encounters often lead to property damage, personal injury, and
even death of Palestinian civilians, at least some of whom were not
involved in any hostilities. Events range from accidental explosion
of land mines, to use of riot control techniques during protest, to
drone attacks and large scale military operations, particularly in
4 Israel’s security forces include IDF, police forces operating in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (mostly through the Border Police Unit), and the General
Security Service. The Author focuses on IDF and military police activity in this
Article, referred to jointly as IDF.
5 For the sake of brevity, this Author shall hereinafter refer to the plaintiffs in
the claims as “Palestinians.”
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the Gaza Strip, such as Operation Cast lead in 20082009. These
incidents give rise to the question of whether the State should be
held liable in torts for injuries sustained by Palestinians due to IDF
activities in the OPT, and if so, under which circumstancesa
question which provokes turbulent political debate given its
charged background. This question arose in full force following
the events of the First Intifada, which erupted in late 1987.6 As a
result of Palestinians’ injuries in the events of the First Intifada,
many lawsuits were filed with Israel’s national courts by plaintiffs
claiming that the State was liable for their injuries (“the First Intifada Claims”).
In principle, Israeli tort law enables tort claims against the State
for any wrongful act that its agents have committed, including IDF
soldiers.7 This liability rule is established in the Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law (“the Act”).8 Therefore, Palestinian victims
of said confrontations were able to bring claims before Israeli civil
courts.9 This, of course, raised questions concerning choice of law
in the OPT, i.e. whether these lawsuits should be adjudicated according to Israeli tort law. Due to the special status of the OPT, the
policy of the Israeli government and judiciary was to allow such

6 For a review of these events and their legal impact, see HCJ 8276/05 Adalah
v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 (2006) (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
7 Initially, the Civil Wrongs Law did not include an explicit provision that
tied State liability to that of its agents. This created interpretive difficulties for the
courts, and therefore, the Civil Wrongs Law was amended in 1985 (Amendment
No. 3) to provide that when the State is immune from suit, so are its agents, and
vice versa. See Israel Gilead, Tort Liability of Public Authorities and Public Officials
(Parts I and II), 2 MISHPAT U’MIMSHAL 339 (1994) (in Hebrew).
8 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712–1952, § 3, 1 (as amended)
(Isr.) [hereinafter “Civil Tort Act”], https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/
features/compensation/law-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LEY-HK82] (unofficial
translation) (“The State is not civilly liable for an act done within the scope of lawful authority, or bona fide in the purported exercise of lawful authority; but it is
liable for negligence in connection with such an act.”).
9 Israeli trial courts are divided into two levels: Magistrate Courts, which in
civil cases have jurisdiction over matters up to two and a half million (2,500,000)
New Israeli Shekel (“NIS”) (approximately six hundred and fifty thousand
(650,000) U.S. Dollars); and District Courts, which in civil cases have jurisdiction
over cases in which more than two and a half million (2,500,000) NIS are in dispute. The district courts also hear appeals of judgments of the magistrate courts.
In the context of this Article, both instances adjudicate cases of Palestinians’ tort
claims against Israel, according to an estimated amount of damages assessed by
plaintiffs.
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claims without bars of jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing.10
However, the Act lays down another hurdle in the path of Palestinians seeking remedy. According to the Act, “[t]he State is not
civilly liable for an act done in the course of a combat action of the
Israel Defense Forces.”11 The legal meaning of this immunity is
that only in cases in which the action conducted by the IDF did not
constitute a “Combat Action” should courts examine the validity of
the claim based on the State’s fault.12
The First Intifada Claims gave rise to the question of how to
correctly interpret the term “Combat Action.” According to Jacob,
because the original version of the Act did not include a definition
for the term, Israeli trial courts interpreted it to the best of their
understanding.13 Jacob labeled the courts’ interpretations of
“Combat Action” as either expansive or restrictive. Although both
interpretative trends held that Israeli authorities’ actions during
the First Intifada could be protected by sovereign immunity, the
tendency reflected in the expansive trend was to view most of
these actions as “Combat Actions,” whereas the restrictive trend
distinguished between “police work” and “Combat Action,” and
sought to examine each case separately, according to its circum10 For a detailed review of the issue, see Michael M. Karayanni, Choice of Law
Under Occupation: How Israeli Law came to Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L
L. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing the development of Israeli choice-of-law rules in civil actions filed by Palestinian plaintiffs before Israeli courts when the cause of action
was based in the OPT); MICHAEL M. KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT: A
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE STUDY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2014)
(analyzing legal doctrines instructing Israeli courts for civil suits pertaining to the
OPT from 1967 to present). For the history and politics of this policy and its implications on international law, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE:
THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1925 (2002) (discussing events that led to the Israeli Supreme Court’s position on jurisdiction, justiciability, and substantive norms concerning the Court’s power of review over
actions in military areas not part of Israeli sovereign territory).
11 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
This constitutes an exception to the general rule set forth in Section 2, according to
which the State will not be treated differently with regard to its liability in torts
than any other incorporated entity. See Id. § 2 (“For the purpose of civil liability,
the State shall, save as hereinafter provided, be regarded as a corporate body.”).
12 Tamar Gidron, Liability of the State and of Public Authorities in Negligence in
Israel – A Slippery Slope, 51 HA’PRAKLIT L. REV. 443, 454 (2011) (in Hebrew) (explaining that there are instances in which there is actual harm to an individual but
she cannot sue because the harm occurred during a military operation).
13 Assaf Jacob, Immunity under Fire: Sovereign Immunity for Damage Caused by
Combat Action, 33 MISHPATIM L. REV. 107, 15859 (2003) (in Hebrew).
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stances. This mixed approach allowed some Palestinian claimants
to succeed in receiving remedy for their injuries from the State.14
Eventually, in Beni Uda v. The State of Israel (the “Beni Uda
case”), this interpretive question reached the doorstep of the Israeli
Supreme Court.15 In the Beni Uda case, IDF soldiers shot at Palestinian fugitives, although they were not in danger. The issue was
whether this constituted “Combat Action.” The Supreme Court
held that the term “Combat Action” should be narrowly understood, and it is necessary to distinguish between police-like activities and combatant actions undertaken by the IDF in the OPT. The
Court held that the matter should be decided on a case-by-case basis, and when the operation involved high levels of risk to IDF soldiers, actions directed against terrorist organizations could amount
to combat actions in certain cases. The Beni Uda case was not considered a case of “Combat Action.”
Meanwhile, in September 2000, the events of the Second Intifada began, causing numerous injuries to Palestinians and leading to
a high volume of lawsuits against the State.16 Due to these events
and the fact that the Israeli legislature (“Knesset”) was not satisfied
with the interpretation given to the term “Combat Action” in the
Beni Uda case, Amendment (No. 4) was enacted (“the 2002
Amendment”).
Under the 2002 Amendment, a definition was added to the
term “Combat Action.” The definition contained actions against
terrorist organizations, which “includes any action combating terrorism, hostile acts, or insurrection, and also an action intended to
prevent terrorism, hostile acts, or insurrection that is taken in a situation endangering life or limb.”17 The 2002 Amendment also
added new articles which set forth special procedural arrangements for claims arising from IDF actions in the OPT. These inSee generally id. at 15963.
CA 5964/92 Beni Uda v. The State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.) (in Hebrew). The Israeli Supreme Court has two major functions: it serves as an appellate
court, and as the High Court of Justice. In the Beni Uda case, the Supreme Court
served as an appellate court for the district court’s adjudication of the claim.
16 For a detailed review of the events of the Second Intifada, see Michele K.
Esposito, The al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations,
and Losses in the First Four Years, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 85 (2005) (discussing military operations, outbreak, losses, Palestinian suicide attacks, and Israeli assassinations during the Second Intifada).
17 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 1.
14
15
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cluded, for example, shortening the statute of limitations on such
tort claims from seven to two years.18 The 2002 Amendment shifted the focus of the adjudication process to the question of whether
the IDF act was performed through a “Combat Action.” This Article examines, among other things, the extent to which this shift was
successful.
Although the Article is primarily concerned with the 2002
Amendment, additional remarks are in order regarding the developments that followed its enactment. Following the 2002 Amendment, the Israeli government initiated another bill, further limiting
state liability for Palestinians’ injuries caused by IDF actions.
Amendment (No. 7) dealt with claims filed by residents of “conflict
zones,”19 and provided that the State is not liable for any action
taken by IDF within such zones, thus excluding claims by most
Palestinians residing in the OPT.20 This Amendment was partially
invalidated by the HCJ, which held that it disproportionately violated the right of Palestinians to compensation outside the scope of
“Combat Action.”21
Yet, the political process aimed at restricting the State’s liability
for Palestinians’ injuries persisted, and Amendment (No. 8) was
18 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5A(3) (“The court shall not hear a claim filed
more than two years from the day of the act that is the subject of the claim . . . .”).
Additional important changes included: a requirement to submit a notice of claim
within sixty days from the date of the incident, and a change in the standard of
proof in these claims. Id. §5A(2)(b)(c). The Amendment stated that rules that
shift the burden of proof to the defendant—in cases where the object which
caused the injury was dangerous or when there exists factual vagueness with regard to the circumstances which led to the injury—will not apply to the claims in
question. See Tort Ordinance (New Version), 57291968, §§ 38, 41 (as amended)
(Isr.); Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5A(4).
19 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5C(e) (“‘Conflict Zone’—a zone outside the
territory of the State of Israel, which the Minister of Defense has declared as set
forth in subsection (c), in which the security forces acted or were present in the
zone within the context of a conflict.”).
20 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5C(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the State shall not be subject to liability under the law of torts for damage
sustained in a Conflict Zone due to an act performed by the security forces . . . .”).
Additionally, Section 5B provided that the State is not liable for injury sustained
by an enemy state national, by a person who is an active member of a terrorist organization, or by a person injured while acting as an agent of these entities. Id. §
5B(a)(1)(3). Note, Section 5B was upheld by the Supreme Court in Adalah v.
Government of Israel. HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1
(2006) (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
21 HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 (2006) (Isr.) (in
Hebrew).
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enacted in 2012 (“the 2012 Amendment”).22 Though the 2012
Amendment pays lip service to the HCJ’s judgment, by removing
the invalidated article, in effect, it attempts to reverse the ruling,
replacing case-by-case analysis with the use of sweeping exemption categories and restating the essence of the 2005 Amendment.23
It also places additional procedural hurdles for Palestinians victims
seeking a remedy.24 Lastly, as of July 2014, Gaza Strip residents are
no longer eligible to bring tort claims against Israel, as the Gaza
Strip was declared “enemy territory” by the Israeli Prime Minister.25
This brief review of the Act’s legislative history calls for the
topic addressed in this Article, namely how the relationship between the Knesset and Israel’s civil courts is reflected in court decisions in the tort claims in question, specifically focusing on the impact of the 2002 Amendment.26 The Article sheds light on a
relatively neglected phenomenon among legal scholarsthe politics of judicial decision-making on the trial court level. This Author suggests that the dynamics between the courts and the Knesset have had a deep impact on civil litigation within the Conflict,
and are therefore important to explore. Furthermore, the discus22 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law (Amendment No. 8), 57682008,
(Isr.) [hereinafter “Civil Tort Act (Amendment No. 8)”], http://
www.hamoked.org/files/2011/9083_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBG3-3TAN]
(unofficial translation).
23 Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Definition of “Combat Action” in Civil Tort
Law (Liability of the State), 10 TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY (2009), http://
en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-10,-october-2009/
definition-of-combat-action-in-civil-tort-law-(liability-of-the-state)/
[https://
perma.cc/6GVM-XVEW] (analyzing the 2012 Amendment and suggesting it essentially overrides the Court's ruling in the Adalah case).
24 Among other changes implemented by the 2012 Amendment, it requires
courts to decide on “Combat Action” immunity claims as a preliminary plea; it
expands the exemption of Article 5B to apply to residents of enemy territory; and
it holds that the assessment of compensation will be conducted according to
standards applicable in the place of residence of the plaintiff, thus inherently limiting the prospective amount of damages for Palestinians. Civil Tort Act
(Amendment No. 8), supra note 22, § 24. For more on these restrictions, see Gilat
Bachar, Access Denied – Using Procedure to Restrict Tort Litigation: the IsraeliPalestinian Experience, 92(3) CHIC.-KENT L. REV. (Forthcoming, 2017) (exploring the
various barriers Palestinians face in bringing tort claims against the Israeli government).
25 Civil Tort Ordinance (Liability of the State) (Declaration of Enemy Territory – the Gaza Strip), 7431-2014, (Isr.).
26 Since the time frame for the Study stops at 2012, the impact of the 2012
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Study.
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sion bears implications for the study of the potential role of monetary awards granted by states as a mechanism for dealing with civilians’ injuries,27 which is yet to be fully developed in the context
of ethno-national conflicts.28 With this background in mind, the
next Section describes the relevant scholarship on legislaturecourts dynamics in the United States and in Israel.

27 This issue has been dealt with in various contexts, such as compensation
for injuries inflicted by terrorism acts, crime, and war. See Deborah R. Hensler,
Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and
Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 418 (2003) (exploring tort compensation surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans,
Can Money Symbolize Acknowledgment? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary
Awards for Their Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 245 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3267030/ [https://perma.cc/
96JC-RXM9] (comparing tort compensation for emotional harm suffered by close
family members of crime or accident victims in different legal systems); Yael Ronen, Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During
Armed Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 183 (2009) (discussing injury or
death “as incidental outcomes of military attack” as a result of new military technology and changes in warfare and the role of compensation in addressing such harm
to civilians).
28 But there is a rich scholarship in social psychology that deals with the psychological dynamics of ethno-national conflicts, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
in particular. See Nadim N. Rouhana & Daniel Bar-Tal, Psychological Dynamics of
Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
761,
761
(1998),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232522388_
Psychological_Dynamics_of_Intractable_Ethnonational_Conflicts_The_IsraeliPalestinian_Case [https://perma.cc/4UZJ-LFZR] (arguing that some ethnonational conflicts have characteristics that increase their resistance to change, and
that societies in such conflicts form societal beliefs that, on the one hand, help
them cope with the stressful conditions of the conflicts but, on the other hand,
perpetuate the conflicts); Byron Bland, Brenna Powell & Lee Ross, Barriers to Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Peacemaking and Relationships Between Adversaries, in
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 265 (Ryan Goodman,
Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012) (discussing psychological barriers to
conflict resolution in intergroup conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict).
One question which arises from these works is what can be done to address the
societal beliefs acquired by Palestinian and Israeli societies as a result of the Conflict. However, exploring the potential role of monetary compensation in postconflict reconciliation is beyond the scope of this Research.
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3. LEGISLATURE-COURT DYNAMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
NEW LEGISLATION

3.1. Congress-Judiciary Relations in the United States – Comparative
Observations
The complex relationship between the judicial branch and
the legislature in the United States has long been acknowledged,
and has been the subject of abundant scholarship. For the purpose
of this Article, which cannot encompass this extensive writing, the
Author focuses on one key aspect of the literature: potential explanations to courts’ interaction with the legislature through statutory
interpretation, with a particular eye towards the way in which
courts implement a legislative change.29
Over the years, various answers have been given and different
research models developed in response to the question of what
comprises judges’ considerations when deciding disputes. The last
several decades have seen a shift from the legal formalism of the early 19th century, which believed in the judge’s ability to place facts
into a mathematical-like formula and calculate the “correct” legal
result,30 to the attitudinal model first introduced in the 1960s. Ac29 By doing so, the Author focuses on models of judicial decision-making that
assume rationality among judges, as opposed to another important school of
thought for studying judicial decision-making, through cognitive psychology and
behavioral theory. According to the latter, judges, as human beings, are susceptible to the distortive, unconscious effects of interrelated cognitive biases and psychological phenomena, which impact their decision-making. See Eyal Zamir &
Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation,
41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 165 (2012) (discussing omission bias as a reason for the actual standard of proof in civil litigation to exceed fifty-one percent, higher than
the formal rule of preponderance of evidence); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial
Judges?,
84
NOTRE
DAME
L.
REV.
1195,
1195
(2009),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/786/?utm_source=scholarship.law.co
rnell.edu%2Ffacpub%2F786&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPag
es [https://perma.cc/7ZUQ-SBAS] (asserting that judges harbor implicit biases
affecting judgment).
30 See Karen Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel, 8
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 556, 557 (2011) (“The legal model evolved and was refined from the legal formalism of the early 19th century, which viewed legal logic
as an inner perfection unto itself, and believed in the judge's ability to place facts
into a mathematical-like formula and calculate the ‘correct’ legal result.” (citing
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cording to the attitudinal model, which developed with the rise of
the behavioralist approach to political science and realist legal theories, the law is intended to no more than camouflage justices’
genuine considerations and grant legitimacy to their decisions.31
Since these early days, though, scholars have tweaked the basic notion of the attitudinal model, creating a more nuanced understanding of judicial decision-making.32
Attempts to analyze the strategic interactions between courts
and legislatures typically use an individualistic approach; that is,
an approach which views courts or judges as having an independent political agenda. These studies combine judges’ preferences
and strategies with extra-judicial influences, to explain the ways in
which institutional structures shape judicial policy.33 From this
perspective, Supreme Court justices may certainly have interests
independent of those shared by certain social groups. In this context, rational choice theory views Supreme Court justices as players
who act strategically to advance their policy goals and, in order to
minimize the possibility of congressional override, may adjust the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal positions and may not vote according to

Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997))).
31 Id. at 558 (“[V]oices began to be heard calling for a new, neo-institutional
approach to judiciary politics studies. These voices advocated changing the research focus from the policy preferences of particular judges to the characteristics
of the court as an institution, its relationship with other political institutions, and
how this affects and shapes justices’ policy preferences.”). See generally WALTER F.
MURPHY, CHARLES HERMAN PRITCHETT, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, COURTS,
JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (6th ed., 2006)
(discussing, inter alia, U.S. judicial decision-making); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (asserting that judges are policy makers who decide often based on personal policy
preferences).
32 Weinshall-Margel, supra note 30, at 558 (“[A] judge’s decision is influenced
not only by institutional restrictions and the sense of danger in deciding based
solely on his or her priorities, but also by the sense of obligation to act according
to the law.”).
33 For reviews of the various studies and approaches which comprise this literature, see Weinshall-Margel, supra note 30; Assaf Meydani & Shlomo Mizrahi,
The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Parliament in Light of the Theory of
Moves: The Case of Israel, 22 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 55, 62 (2010),
http://is.muni.cz/el/1422/jaro2013/MVV2868K/um/MEYDANI_MIZRAHI__ISC_vs._Parliament_in_Light_of_the_Theory_of_Moves.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E3DE-Z7KH] (discussing different studies that analyze Supreme Court behavior
from an individualistic or rational choice perspective).
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their sincere preferences.34 In contrast, the neo-institutionalist approach views judges as interested in preserving their organization’s
power and authority.35 Eskridge, for example, argues that current
legislative expectations are usually more important to the Court
than original legislative intent.36 In this context, some scholars
suggest viewing judicial activism as a strategic move which attempts to increase the Supreme Court’s independence and
strengthen the norms derived from its rulings.37
This body of research supports the view that political discourse
may well affect judicial decision-making. It gives a sound foundation, both theoretical and empirical, to the fact that the relationship
between supreme courts and legislatures is taken into account by
both these entities. It also underpins the view of supreme courts as
attempting to maintain their institutional independence and stance
vis-à-vis legislatures through their decisions while trying to remain
within the boundaries of public opinion. However, missing in this
34 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 61617 (1991),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3835/?utm_source=digitalcom
mons.law.yale.edu%2Ffss_papers%2F3835&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=
PDFCoverPages [https://perma.cc/37WQ-AZDR].
35 See, e.g., Albert Breton, Organizational Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: An Integrative Essay, 11 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 411, (1995), http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/017626809500011L [https://perma.cc/JRH4-DFNC] (discussing organizational agency issues within bureaucracies).
36 William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court's Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4816&context=fss_papers [https://perma.cc/6CVGMZE7] (“This study suggests . . . that current legislative expectations are usually
more important to the Court than original legislative expectations.”).
37 See Omri Yadlin, Judicial Discretion and Judicial Activism as a Strategic Game,
19 BAR-ILAN UNI. L. REV. 665 (2003) (in Hebrew) (comparing judicial activism in
the House of Lords in England, the United States Supreme Court and the Israeli
Supreme Court.). For empirical research testing these theories, see, e.g., Robert D.
Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 29596 (1996), http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/014481889600018X
[https://
perma.cc/3JWU-DXBT] (addressing the question of how much discretion judges
have interpreting statutes and offering a game theory model directed towards approaching the problem. According to the authors' analysis, judges are constrained
by the possibility of legislative reversal of decisions, so the space for judicial discretion expands as overriding the court becomes more difficult); Pablo T. Spiller &
Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S.
Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463, 463 (1992)
(developing an econometric model to explore Supreme Court decision-making
subject to the constraints of Congress and the president).
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scholarship are the trial courts: do they interact in a similar manner
with the legislature when deciding politically-charged cases? And
if so, what are their motivations? This issue has attracted significantly less attention in the scholarship.38
That is not to say that the analysis of lower courts’ decisionmaking in the context of statutory interpretation has been completely absent from current scholarship.39 The empirical writing in
this field occasionally analyzes judicial decision-making in lower
state and federal courts, and examines judges’ approaches to statutory interpretation.40 This literature has also recognized political
incentives that drive lower court judges, primarily those related either to judges’ partisan loyalty or to the effects of periodic review
of judges who stand for reelection.41 Yet such writing generally
does not deal directly with the dialogue between these courts and
the legislature as manifested in judicial opinions. Rather, it focuses
on statutory interpretation or on sentencing decisions by lower
courts, in consideration of their own goals and aspirations or vis-àvis norms established by the Supreme Court.42
Friedman, supra note 1, at 265 (“Many of the political science studies focus
on the Supreme Court. But if constraint is the issue, all the important action might
be in the lower courts.”).
39 For work not only looking at the interaction between the three branches
with regard to statutory interpretation, but also dedicating some attention to lower courts in this context, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (2d ed. 2014).
40 An interesting example is the extensive work done on product liability law
in a variety of U.S. states. Henderson & Eisenberg used appellate and trial court
decisions to show that changes in judicial decision-making are occurring, and that
current trends show defendants as the favored parties. Another inference from
their research is that the legislature’s action in this field was unnecessary, as it has
been preempted by a change, which already gradually took place in the judicial
approach. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 20 ANGLO.-AM. L. REV. 188, 189 (1991) (explaining how the
roots of the judicial lawmaking trend in the products liability sphere began in the
early 1980s, after which the legislature sought to rein in defendant-favoring doctrines with post-hoc legislation).
41 See, e.g., Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected
Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360, 1360
(2013) (studying the influence of election systems on state court judges and their
criminal sentencing decisions); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247,
247-48 (2004) (developing and testing a theory specifying the conditions under
which trial judges will alter their sentencing behavior to improve their electoral
prospects).
42 As for the latter, recently published work had looked at the way lower
38
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When it comes to research that specifically concerns the influence of a legislative change on lower courts’ decisions, scholars
have concentrated on examining the effective outcomes of such alterations in the governing law on the specific topic of interest,43 rather than on judiciary-legislature dynamics reflected in the decisions.44 This work nevertheless provides important background
for judiciary-legislature dynamics, as it asserts the notion that
courts react in their decision-making to legislative attempts to limit
their discretion.
One example worth mentioning on statutory interpretation
trends in lower courts is a study conducted by James Nehf.45 Nehf
argues that the current debate over interpretive theory will lose
momentum if the focus continues to be solely on theories derived
from Supreme Court decisions, since that Court’s role is concerned
more with constitutional interpretation, and the decision-making
process is markedly different in other courts. Nehf’s findings show
a strong tendency in lower courts of relying on textual sources for
statutory interpretation, and suggest that such methods allow for
extremely flexible interpretations, where courts can justify virtually
courts respond to changes in the Supreme Court’s rules of statutory interpretation. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 481, 483 (2015) (considering “the relationship between the Supreme
Court’s methodological practices . . . and the behavior of other courts”).
43 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471
(1987–1988) (specifically examining the impact of legislative changes on juvenile
courts).
44 A rare example can be found in a study on the effects on decision-making
when judicial discretion in criminal sentencing is confined. It has been suggested
that courts should beware of light sentencing, especially in high-profile cases, as
this may provoke Congress to start down the mandatory minimum road, thus
confining their discretion. See Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire:
The Dangers of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J.
CORP. L. 619, 619 (2006) (analyzing federal sentencing reform in white collar crime
cases, and the possibility of imposing mandatory minimums for certain corporate
crimes). Despite differences in context and method, the conclusions of this research are important for this Study: a statutory reform aimed at changing courts’
case law and affecting their scope of discretion.
45 See James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 3-5 (1994) (arguing that present
scholarship regarding interpretive theory focuses on Supreme Court decisions as
the principal resource due to two main reasons: first, a premise that such decisions represent the hardest, and therefore most interesting, cases; and second, a
bias among academics as a result of their past as Supreme Court clerks).
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any decision they desire. These findings reflect reasoning methods
used by lower court judges when implementing legislation with
which they do not necessarily agree. Nehf’s study thus stresses the
importance of analyzing lower court decisions in the field of statutory implementation.
3.2. Knesset-Judiciary Relations in Israel
This Section briefly outlines the literature on the relations between the judiciary and the political system in Israel against the
backdrop of Israel’s unique institutional structure.46 In Israeli
scholarship, much like in U.S. scholarship, the focus in this area
had been almost exclusively on the Supreme Court—its status, interests, and interaction with the Knesset. Very few studies have
looked at, or even mentioned, lower courts in this context.
For many years, a single majority party controlled the Israeli
parliament, and the judiciary was relatively passive. The jurisprudence of these years expresses a belief in strict separation of powers between the Knesset and the courts.47 However, since the
1970s, the Israeli Supreme Court has assumed a more active role in
criticizing state actions. The Court has increased its involvement in
political decisions, and intensified its level of judicial review of
statutes.48 In developing a rich jurisprudence on political and civil
46 See Gad Barzilai, Courts as Hegemonic Institutions: The Israeli Supreme Court
in a Comparative Perspective, 5 ISR. AFF. 15, 31 (1998) (describing the Israeli Supreme
Court in light of Israeli politics and global trends); Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric,
Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice
during the Intifada, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 320 (1999) (arguing that evaluating
judicial rhetoric and out-of-court practices and procedures can point to conclusions about Israeli institutions).
47 MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 75-90 (2011) (arguing that this approach enabled the legal community to maintain and develop the
evolving values of Israeli law, which were in tension with, if not contradiction to,
some of the central values of the hegemonic culture); see generally SHIMON
SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY (1994) (studying the
revolution regarding the role played by the judiciary, particularly the Supreme
Court in Israeli society and the system of government).
48 This process was largely attributed to the growing impact of liberal values
within Israeli political culture, combined with the absence of a written constitution in a highly polarized and fragmented society. Some scholars also connect it
to the divided structure of Israeli politics. The deepening social rift and the decrease in the public’s regard towards politicians’ credibility have led the Court to
be considered not only the most reliable institution in the country, but also the on-
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rights, the Court has intervened in socio-political and governmental policies.49 In most cases, the Knesset chose not to exercise its
formal authority and accepted the Court’s rulings, thereby increasing the Supreme Court’s power at the expense of the Knesset’s status.50 This process has turned the Supreme Court into one of the
most significant and powerful players in politics and society in Israel.51
One key question in this scholarship is what drives the Court in
resolving disputes that are intimately related to political issues.
Three main emphases in the Court’s motives can be identified in
the scholarship: social values and partisan-structural factors;52 rely institution capable of addressing social and political conflicts. One way in
which the Court went about widening its role in Israeli society was by interpreting legal terms such as “standing” and “justiciability” in a broad fashion, thus allowing it to take an active part in all walks of social and political life in Israel. See
MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 90–145 (recounting historical events that led to the
Court’s role in Israeli society). See also Daphne Barak-Erez, Broadening the Scope of
Judicial Review in Israel: Between Activism and Restraint, 3 INDIAN. J. CONS. L. 118, 118
(2009) (assessing the developments and doctrinal changes that led to the expansion of judicial review involving the Israeli Supreme Court); Barzilai, supra note
46, at 18 (describing how the active judicial review in Israel might mean the State
is better defined as a “judicial-administrative regime.”).
49 See Yoav Dotan, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities
in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
1059, 1064 (1999) (describing how the Court has developed rich jurisprudence in
political rights and intervened in governmental policies on many occasions).
50 See ASSAF MEYDANI, THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: COURTS AS AGENDA SETTERS 3 (2011) (explaining how the relationship
between the Court and the parliament was transformed, leading to a change regarding the “who governs?” rule). See also EDELMAN, infra note 60, at 12 (suggesting that the fact that courts impose only the most basic, most widely accepted values of natural justice precludes the Knesset’s reversal).
51 See Barzilai, supra note 46, at 19-20 (theorizing that the increased judicial
activism of the Court is due in part to increased public reliance as a result of lack
of confidence in the political institutions). However, this process has also invoked
much controversy. A key critique, made by Ruth Gavison, suggests that in rifted
democracies such as Israel, courts should be reluctant to intervene in political priorities, especially in areas of social controversy. According to Gavison, such determinations should be left to the political branches, while the courts should concentrate on defending individuals against the clear violation of basic rights and
the conditions necessary for effective democracy. Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts
in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 227 (1999). Gavison's view has gained
traction in Israeli politics in recent years.
52 See, e.g., Barzilai, supra note 46, at 25 (stating partisan, self-interested institutions as adding to a sense of legitimacy). In contrast to the U.S. system, Israel
has a parliamentary system with relatively strong party control over its members,
which in turn affects the relationship between the Knesset and the courts.
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lations and interests among the ruling elite;53 and cultural factors.54
Some scholars have stressed the Court’s interests in preserving its
judicial independence and its institutional stance against the legislature, as is seen in U.S. literature.55 Along the same lines, other
scholars suggest that the Court’s intervention in political issues is a
means of establishing judges as “experts” who determine the extent to which a certain political decision is reasonable.56 Both these
views represent the abovementioned individualistic approach. A
different view is posited by Mautner, who contends that the Court
has been a channel for specific groups in Israeli society to advance
their liberal values over those held by other sectors.57 Indeed, the
literature provides various explanations to the behavior of the
Court in its relationship with the Knesset and different answers as
to whether the Court is only interested in protecting its institutional status, or also seeks to promote a value-based agenda that might
clash with the goals of the legislature. However, this scholarship
53 See, e.g., EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY, A PLACE AT THE TOP: ELITES AND ELITISM IN
ISRAEL (1997).
54 See, e.g., MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 7980 (arguing that “throughout Israel’s six decades of statehood,” cultural paradigms regarding issues like human
rights have influenced the Court’s promotion of a more liberal system). This, of
course, is merely a rough distinction since some of the works in this field, such as
Mautner’s, combine different types of factors which influence judiciary-Knesset
relations.
55 See Barzilai, supra note 46, at 28 (discussing how the Israeli Supreme Court
began exercising a supervisory function over Knesset legislation and nullify laws
not aligned with Israel’s status as a democratic and Jewish state); see also PATRICIA
J. WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONAL POLITICS: COURTS AND GENDER IN THE
RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CONFLICT IN ISRAEL 8 (2008) (alteration in original) (“[W]hen
courts challenge other state institutions, and particularly when they challenge
administrative power in favor of individual rights, they may experience the most
dramatic gains in judicial power. When courts increase judicial power in this
way, they may be demonstrating a substantively new type of judicial independence associated with high degrees of judicial power.”).
56 Ronen Shamir, The Politics of Reasonability: Discretion as Judicial Power, 5
THEORY & CRITICISM 7 (1994) (in Hebrew) (discussing the increasing involvement
of the Israeli Supreme Court in public life).
57 See MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 75 (arguing that a significant shift in the
Court’s jurisprudence was “the shift from the Court’s view of itself as a professional institution whose role is to settle disputes, to a view of itself as a political
institution that participates in determining the values that prevail in the country
and the distribution of its material resources”); see also Bryna Bogoch & Yifat
Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court of Justice, in
LAW IN MANY SOCIETIES 3133 (Lawrence M. Friedman, Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo &
Manuel A. Gómez eds., 2011) (suggesting an analysis that factors in media portrayal of Court decisions within the context of endorsing specific ideologies).
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almost entirely ignores Israel’s lower courts, which deal with politically-charged controversies on a daily basis.
Nevertheless, the dominant focus on the fundamental features
of the dynamic between the Court and the Knesset may assist our
study of lower courts. The important role of the Court in Israeli
society establishes the backdrop against which the judicial and the
legislative branches interact. More specifically, given the influence
of the Court on the legal system as a whole, which stems in large
part from Israel’s common law tradition and the role of precedents,
the described dynamic may affect the relationship between trial
courts and Knesset as well, when applying the necessary changes.
Building on these foundations, this Article seeks to expand the current literature by empirically examining the role trial courts assume in adjudicating socially and politically complex cases.
This Article is especially concerned with trial judges’ responses
to a legislative change aimed at limiting their discretion. In this
sense, the analysis of judiciary-Knesset relations in Israel builds on
research examining the effect of changes in legislation on the judicial approach to statute interpretation.58 In this context, LevinsonZamir addressed the implications of the enactment of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, which includes the protection of the
right to property, on courts’ interpretation of expropriation statutes. Since prior to the enactment of the Basic Law the right to
property was already acknowledged as constitutional, LevinsonZamir did not expect to find a significant change following the
Basic Law’s promulgation. However, she found the new legislation actually had a profound effect on judges’ approach to expropriation cases, particularly on district court judges.59 Although her
analysis is mostly doctrinal, and the evidentiary support is anecdotal, her study points to the potential psychological influence a
change in the governing legislation may have on judicial decisionmaking, especially at the lower levels.

58 For background on this issue, see generally ASSAF MEYDANI & SHLOMO
MIZRAHI, PUBLIC POLICY – BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW (2006) (in Hebrew).
59 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Constitutional Protection of Property in Land and
the Law of Expropriation, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOSHUA WEISMAN 375 (2002) (in
Hebrew); see also Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New
Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 41 (1991) (reviewing methods used by
the Court to implement a new policy for reviewing exercise of emergency powers
by Israeli security authorities).
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3.3. The Missing Piece: The Rest of the Court System
Current scholarship has established the existence of an ongoing
conversation between supreme courts and legislatures both in the
United States and in Israel. This research has used the back and
forth dialogue between these entities about legislation as evidence
of power dynamics and has emphasized the Supreme Court’s interests, either in maintaining its judicial independence and power
vis-à-vis the legislature, or in promoting social values.
The relative lack of attention given to lower courts’ interaction
with legislatures raises the question: Are these courts worth studying? And if so, why? Several intertwined considerations make
lower courts an important area for research in this context. First,
the high volume of cases they handle as well as the serious practical consequences of their decisions for the parties involvedespecially in volatile contexts like the one discussed
hereturn them into important actors in the political space surrounding the disputes. In the context discussed here, the core of
the legal activity is done at the trial court level, whereas only few
cases make it to the Supreme Court on appeal. Second, lower
courts often possess a variety of legal tools for statutory interpretation, which allow them to use their discretion in flexible, diverse
ways. The use of these methods is particularly intriguing when it
comes to navigating politically-charged cases. For all these reasons, this Study chooses to focus on these courts.
One of the few references to the civil court system as a whole in
the literature on judiciary-legislature relations in Israel can be
found in the work of Edelman. Edelman contends that the system
has undergone a process similar to that of the Supreme Court,
gradually accumulating authority and considerable political power.60 This statement calls for empirical examination that asks
whether these courts have indeed taken a path similar to the Supreme Court’s in addressing politically-charged disputes, and if so,
were they driven by the aspiration to protect their judicial independence vis-à-vis the Knesset, or were other interests involved?
60
MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 4447 (1994)
(arguing civil courts have come to be seen as objective, fair institutions “by emphasizing the rights of citizens and other residents who have come into conflict
with governmental agencies,” thereby playing an increasingly important role in
Israeli society).
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These questions remain unanswered by the current literature. This
Article contributes to closing this gap by examining the case of tort
lawsuits brought by Palestinians against Israel. The Article strives
to better explain the behavior of trial court judges, arguing they
should be viewed as political players holding an institutional
agenda vis-à-vis the Knesset. By so doing, the Article offers new
insights on judiciary-legislature relations in Israel.
4. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF PALESTINIANS’ TORT CLAIMS AGAINST
ISRAEL
“The court does not engage in the political aspects of the Intifada . . .
the role of the court is to deal with a specific set of facts brought before it
in the case in question and with the extent to which this set of facts establishes or does not establish liability.”
Abu-Shmalla v. The State of Israel61
“The courts are thrown into this political commotion and are not sure
how to swallow the beast.”
Advocate Abu-Hussein62
This Study is aimed at examining the impact of the 2002
Amendment on Israeli trial courts’ case law, and the political power dynamics reflected in that case law. The 2002 Amendment
changed the Act in two main ways. First, the Amendment defined
the term “Combat Action,” which significantly expanded the scope
of sovereign immunity, thus restricting the State’s liability for injuries caused by IDF actions. Importantly, the immunity provided
by the Act means that only where IDF action did not constitute
“Combat Action” should the courts examine the validity of the
claim on the merits. Second, the Amendment shortened the limitations period on tort claims filed on the grounds of IDF actions from
seven to two years.63
The Study analyzed court decisionsN=245, where N is the
61 CC (TA) 69946/93 Abu-Shmalla v. The State of Israel (1999) (Isr.) (finding
for plaintiff).
62 Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012).
63 Other procedural changes were implemented in the 2002 Amendment, including on burden of proof issues. See supra Section 2, Civil Tort Act, notes 8, 18.
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number of court decisions analyzedrendered by district and
magistrate courts between 1992 and 2012ten years before and after the 2002 Amendmentin tort claims filed by Palestinians
against Israel due to IDF actions in the OPT. While the first decade
saw courts ruling for plaintiffs in 39% of the cases, over the second
decade this figure dropped to only 17%. In the same vein, whereas
before 2002 only one decision rested solely on statute of limitations
and no cases were dismissed exclusively due to sovereign immunity, these rationales became dramatically more prevalent after 2002.
This seemingly supports the conclusion that Israeli trial courts
have been heavily influenced by the 2002 Amendment, which in
turn was inspired by the escalation of the Conflict.64
However, the data gathered in this Study allowed for a deeper
look into the adjudication process. This inquiry revealed surprising patterns in the proState versus proplaintiff framework,
which sometimes pulled in different directions. It revealed the
courts’ insistence on delving into the details of IDF conduct, adjudicating the claims on the merits, and defying the attempt to confine their discretion to issues of immunity and statute of limitations. One way this was expressed was by courts maintaining the
tradition of comprehensive decisions that delve into specific circumstances and preserving “pockets” of judicial discretion, such as
a lenient approach towards plaintiffs in costs orders.
Thus, at least until 2012,65 a considerable amount of discretion
still existed for courts adjudicating the claims, allowing more scrutiny of IDF actions that result in Palestinian injuries than the legislature contemplated. Whether these trends are a sign of a judiciary
merely protecting its stance vis-à-vis the Knesset’s attempts to limit
its discretion, or rather an endeavor to preserve judicial independence in order to act as the State’s “conscience” in certain cases, is
hard to say. Nonetheless, the data clearly show that when examining the judicial opinions as a whole, rather than only the outcomes
64 The Study does not control for other political and military events which
occurred in the examined period. Therefore, it may be argued that some of these
findings reflect the escalation of the Conflict rather than the legislative change.
Yet, the 2002 Amendment and the status of the Conflict are in many ways two
sides to the same coina legislative process which reacted to historical and political circumstancesand are therefore inseparable. Changes in judicial decisionmaking trends did occur following the 2002 Amendment, however, and it may be
reasonable to attribute them in large part to the Amendment itself.
65 See discussion infra on later trends in Section 6.
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of the cases, a strong trend of courts attempting to preserve their
judicial discretion is revealed. The next Sections explore and analyze these findings.
4.1. General Observations regarding the Cases and the Outcomes
“[T]his is an unfortunate outcome and one can easily understand the
pain experienced by the family of the deceased, yet the test is not based on
outcome but on action.”
Hamarsha v. The State of Israel66
Several prominent observations emerged from examining the
cases and their outcomes. The data revealed a substantial rise in
the number of cases after the 2002 Amendment, as well as an increase in the prevalence of substantial and severe injuries. The
percentage of cases decided in favor of plaintiffs, however, significantly dropped during that decade.
As Table 1 shows, the population consisted of far more “after”
than “before” cases. Although one could imagine a scenario in
which the Amendment itself led to such a rise in the number of
cases,67 this trend actually appears to be the result of external circumstances: an increase in the number of Palestinian casualties
and instances of property damages as a result of IDF activity in the
decade between 2002 and 2012.68 This surge of injuries has led to
numerous claims, which naturally yielded more decisions.69 How66 CC (Jerusalem) 11103/04 Hamarsha v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) (finding for the State).
67
For example, publicity that made Palestinians more conscious of their
right to seek a remedy for their losses. Adv. Hleihil mentioned she believes that
such a process has taken place in the last decade, and this might explain some of
the differences in claim volume. Interview with Adv. Gada Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013).
68 See generally Esposito, supra note 16, at 97103 (using studies conducted between 2000 and 2004 to analyze the impact of the Al-Aqsa intifada on the Israeli
public); David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1591,
1591 (2008) (using empirical data to examine “whether violence against Israelis
and Palestinians affects the incidence and intensity of each side's reaction”);
B’Tselem: Isr. Info. Ctr. Human Rights Occupied Terr., Statistics, http://
www.btselem.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/5NR9-RU7M] (last visited Nov. 8,
2016) (containing statistics regarding fatalities and casualties from First Intifada to
present).
69 According to information provided by “Yesh Din,” which pertains to the
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ever, a rise in the availability of decisions in recent years, due to
improvement in the data collection methods of commercial databases, may also account for part of the difference.70
Table 1: Distribution of Cases by Instance and Timing
Timing
Instance
Magistrate
(Published)
District
(Published)
Total

1992-2002
(Before Amen.)
21

2002-2012
(After Amen.)
118

Total

38

68

106

59

186

245

139

An important pattern was identified on the severity of damages sustained by plaintiffs before and after the Amendment. The
Study pointed to a statistically significant correlation between the
severity of damages and the Amendment (p=.04).71 That is, as Figure 1 indicates, there were significantly more cases of substantial
and severe injuries after the Amendment compared to cases of
minimal injuries. This finding can be explained primarily by the
various military operations that occurred in the OPT after 2002,
which used more harmful weapons than those used in prior confrontations between IDF and Palestinians.72

years 2004-2008, a total of 5,282 claims were initiated either as lawsuits filed with
Israeli courts or as appeals to the Israeli Ministry of Defense (on file with author).
70 E-mails from Yafit Hannan, Database Rep., Nevo, to author (Oct. 28, 2012
to Jan. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
71 Note the total number of decisions which contained data on this variable
was 231 (N=231).
72 See CC (Jerusalem) 11103/04 Hamarsha v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.)
(finding for the State); see also Sergio Catignani, The Strategic Impasse in LowIntensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics
During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 57, 58 (2005) (alteration in original) (describing how “tactics, weaponry[,] and training adopted” by Israel have
been extensive and tactically successful); Interview with Adv. Hussein AbuHussein (Dec. 17, 2012).
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Figure 1: Severity of Injuries and the Amendment
9
0

Severe

8
0

Substantial

7
0
6
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0

Minimal

Substantial

Severe

Minimal

1
0
0

Before

Amendment

After

A key finding was the striking decrease in the percentage of
cases in which courts found for plaintiffs following the Amendment. Before the Amendment the overall percentage of cases decided in favor of plaintiffs was 39%. After the Amendment, those
cases amount to only 17% (p< .001).73 This finding seems to affirm
the Amendment’s impact on the outcomes of cases, yet, as noted, it
may also be attributed to the political climate generated by the escalation of the Conflict since the early 2000s, the same climate that
led to the Amendment itself.
The Study also examined the relationship between case outcomes and various characteristics of the claims. One important
variable associated with outcome was plaintiffs’ involvement in
the events which resulted in their injury, for instance by throwing
stones at IDF soldiers. While it was significantly more likely for
uninvolved plaintiffs to receive favorable outcomes before the
Amendment than after the Amendment (p=.04), it was still far
73 An alternative explanation for this finding would be that the decline in the
number of decisions in favor of plaintiffs is connected to the rise in the number of
claims filed. That is, the population of cases may have included more “weak”
cases after the Amendment. However, this does not plausibly explain the whole
trend.
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more plausible for such “innocent” plaintiffs to win after the
Amendment, compared with other types of plaintiffs, i.e., involved
or whose involvement was undetermined. Put more numerically,
in 77% of the cases in which courts found for plaintiffs after the
Amendment, the plaintiffs were uninvolved.74
The data also demonstrated the detrimental effect on outcome
when plaintiffs participated in the hostilities, particularly after the
Amendment. Before the Amendment, 30% of cases were favorable
to plaintiffs when there was some level of plaintiff involvement in
the events leading to the injury. After the Amendment, this figure
dropped to only 10%.75
4.2. The Reasoning of the Decisions
“There are many ways to dismiss a lawsuit.”
Abu Asbi v. The State of Israel76
This brings us to one of the key goals of the research: trying
to tease out the extent to which and the ways in which courts’ reasoning has changed following the 2002 Amendment. As expected,
the Study did find several changes in the salient components of the
reasoning after the Amendment but some of the more interesting
findings pertained to aspects which remained unchanged.
First, one striking finding was the use of the statute of limitations as a primary consideration for dismissing a claim. As mentioned, one of the changes implemented by the Amendment was
shortening the limitations period from seven to two years.77 This
change proved to be influential on trial courts’ reasoning. Whereas
74
Similarly, in 61% of the cases in which courts found for plaintiffs before
the Amendment, the plaintiffs were uninvolved bystanders.
75
This included both plaintiffs who were involved in the hostilities, and
those who were found to have contributory negligence. In this context, as next
elaborated, there were also more cases applying the flexible concept of contributory negligencewhich can be set at any percentage of the responsibility for the
harmbefore the Amendment. See infra Section 5.
76 CC (Jerusalem) 11524/04 Abu Asbi v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (finding for the State based on laches, the plaintiff’s failure to meet the burden of proof,
lack of IDF negligence, and by virtue of sovereign immunity).
77 As noted, plaintiffs were also required by the Amendment to give notice
regarding their claim within sixty days of the event or else lose their right to claim
their losses. Civil Tort Act, supra notes 8, 18.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5

2017]

POWER DYNAMICS IN PALESTINIANS’ TORT CLAIMS

605

before the Amendment only one case, which represented 2%, was
dismissed solely due to the statute of limitations, after the
Amendment, 16% of the dismissed cases rested on this consideration.78
Second, a statistically significant correlation was found between
the Amendment and the courts' tendency to discuss sovereign immunity (R=.217; p<.001).79 That is, after the Amendment the State
was more inclined than before the Amendment to raise the issue of
sovereign immunity. Therefore, courts discussed this issue more
often in their reasoning. This finding in itself is perhaps not surprising, as the Amendment must have prompted government lawyers to use immunity as a preliminary plea.80 However, after the
Amendment, the percentage of cases in which courts’ reasoning
rested solely on sovereign immunity still accounted for only 9% of
cases favorable to the State. This relatively low volume of cases
may indicate that courts were not willing to withdraw from their
traditional role of examining claims on the merits so easily, and
pushed back against the Knesset’s attempt to limit their discretion
to the immunity issue.81
Finally, another finding lies in an area that had not seen a
significant change after the Amendment was passed. This relates
to courts’ inclination to conduct lengthy factual discussions as part
of the reasoning, which remained almost constant before and after
Distributed by instance, cases dismissed based on the statute of limitations
constituted 18% of the dismissed cases after the Amendment at magistrate courts,
in contrast to 13% at district courts. This contradicted interviewees’ impression
that magistrate court judges do not tend to dismiss a case without examining it on
the merits, unlike district court judges. Interview with Adv. Hussein AbuHussein (Dec. 17, 2012); Interview with Adv. Gada Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013).
79
Discussion of sovereign immunity was coded on a five step scale: (1) Invoked-applied lengthily, i.e., over two pages; (2) Invoked-applied briefly, i.e., less
than two pages; (3) Invoked-not applied, i.e., State argued for immunity but the
issue went unmentioned in the reasoning or the court did not rule on this point;
(4) Invoked-rejected, i.e., State argued for immunity but argument was rejected;
and (5) Not invoked, i.e., the issue was not mentioned in the decision. In the analysis, the first two categories were collapsed, then correlation was tested between
the combined variable—Invoked-applied—and the Amendment.
80
Alternatively, this finding might be explained by the increase in combatant military actions in the last decade.
81 Because of small numbers, it is impossible to determine the variables correlated with courts’ focus on sovereign immunity in these particular cases. However, these cases will be revisited below to qualitatively tease out their similarities.
See infra Section 5. Many of these cases seem to share the distinct feature of extensive military operations.
78
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the Amendment. Similarly, the tendency of courts to engage in
comprehensive legal discussions with regard to the state’s liability
persisted after the Amendment.82 In this sense, it appears that the
courts did not fully yield to the Amendment, which aimed to narrow their discretion to statute of limitations and “Combat Action”
immunity, rather than the cases’ merits. Courts continued to pay
close attention in a considerable number of cases to substantive aspects of the casefactual and legal.
Figure 2: Comprehensive Factual/Legal Reasoning and the
Amendment
60.00
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50.00
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Before
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0.00
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4.3. Litigation Costs
“Under the circumstances, it seems unjust and unfit to order the
plaintiff to pay litigation costs.”
Amin v. The State of Israel83
“One can only regret the death of the deceased, but this does not justify imposing liability. . . . [C]onsidering the grim results of the case, there
is no order for costs.”
Abu Hatla v. The State of Israel84

Infra Figure 2.
CC (Jerusalem) 15600/01 Amin v. The State of Israel (2006) (Isr.) (finding
for the State).
84 CC (Haifa) 14685/94 Abu Hatla v. The State of Israel (2004) (Isr.) (finding
for the State).
82
83
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Another element in the content of the decisions, which points
to a more complex judicial approach than expressed by the outcomes, is orders for litigation costs. Israeli courts follow the English law, according to which successful parties to litigation are entitled to seek an order that unsuccessful parties pay their litigation
expenses. However, the judge has considerable discretion in applying this rule.85 Therefore, this element was assumed to be important in assessing judges’ attitudes towards the litigants, as a sort
of window into the mind of judges.
First, the Study revealed a striking disparity between courts’
approaches towards the parties with regard to costs orders, regardless of the Amendment. In the overall pool of cases, while courts
rarely avoided giving an order for costs when the State
lostrepresenting only 7% of the casesthere was no order for
costs in 42% of the cases in which plaintiffs lost.86 This finding
supports the argument that courts use costs orders as a means to
express a more lenient approach towards plaintiffs, in cases in
which they feel compelled to find for the State due to the legal
framework.
But even more striking is the fact that this disparity was not associated with the Amendment: the inclination not to render an order for costs when plaintiffs lose existed before the Amendment
and persisted after it was passed.87 The fact that judges remained
generally lenient towards plaintiffs in deciding costs orders after
the Amendment may point to their reluctance to give in to the antiplaintiff approach embodied by the 2002 Amendment.

85 See KARAYANNI, supra note 10, at 23132 (footnote omitted) (“Under Israeli
law, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to receive compensation for its
litigation expenses from the losing party. In this respect, the trial court has broad
discretion in determining the actual sum of compensation to be levied on the losing party and can certainly take into consideration whether the prevailing party
was also responsible for unnecessary litigation.”).
86
See infra Figure 3 (showing decisions without order for costs by winning
party before and after the Amendment, and in total).
87 See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Decisions without an Order for Costs by Winning Party and Amendment
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4.4. Exgratia Compensation
“The law tries to do justice yet law and justice are like two only partially overlapping circles. . . . The State would do right if despite the outcome of this judgment it will find a way to compensate the plaintiffs as a
tribute of ex-gratia.”
Husun v. Ministry of Defense88
Another way to suggest insight into judges’ attitudes towards the claims was through the intriguing phenomenon of
exgratia compensation. That is, courts’ recommendation to the
State to compensate plaintiffs in the absence of liability and without any admission of fault on the part of the State. The assumption
was that such a recommendation, with regard to which courts enjoy full discretion, might reflect their discomfort with the outcome
or an attempt to reprimand the State for its actions. However,
trends in the Study were ambiguous.
In the overall pool of cases, both before and after the Amend88 CC (Acre) 3055/97 Husun v. Ministry of Defense (2001) (Isr.) (finding for
the State).
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ment was passed, the exgratia recommendation appeared in 7% of
the dismissed cases. Although not statistically significant,89 these
cases shared several characteristics: in 86% of them the plaintiffs
suffered bodily harm, and in 93% the damages were either substantial or severe. Additionally, in 86% of the cases plaintiffs were
innocent bystanders.
Surprisingly, though, whereas before the Amendment courts
recommended exgratia compensation in 25% of the dismissed cases, after the Amendment this recommendation was given in only
3%. This runs contrary to the expectation that this tool would become more meaningful after the Amendment. While at first glance
this finding confirms the proState approach manifested by the
outcomes, there are also alternative explanations. It could be the
result of courts’ recognition of the ineffectiveness of their suggestions for exgratia compensation. It might also stem from their understanding of the weaknesses of this mechanism, namely the fact
that it allows the State to grant symbolic compensation without acknowledging its wrongdoing. As elaborated in the next Section,
the latter view, which sees this mechanism as inappropriate, was
expressed by several judges.90
The analysis of the decisions thus portrays a complex picture of
the way courts approach the claims. The comprehensive case law
analysis identified several interesting findings, the most puzzling
of which relates to a disparity between two contradicting patterns:
on the one hand, a sharp decrease in decisions in favor of plaintiffs
after the Amendment, accompanied by more extensive use of the
statute of limitations and sovereign immunity; on the other hand, a
consistency in comprehensive factual and legal discussions; limited
use of sovereign immunity as a sole consideration to dismiss
claims; and a benevolent approach towards plaintiffs in costs orders.
The complexity of the findings, this Author argues, points to
trial courts’ attempt to preserve their judicial discretion in the wake
of the Amendment, in areas in which they still enjoy considerable
89 The fourteen (14) cases were too small of a number to allow for statistical
analysis. However, this phenomenon will be revisited in the next Section, to examine the language used by the courts in this context, and the impression of interviewees regarding ex-gratia compensation. See infra Section 5.1.1.
90
See infra Section 5. Such an approach was expressed, for example, in CC
(Haifa) 21738/01 Elmalaha v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.).
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latitude. However, these findings also raise questions that are not
fully answered by the quantitative analysis. Understanding how
courts go about the process of maintaining their discretion required further investigation by delving into the rhetoric and specific circumstances of the opinions. The next Section is thus designed
to complement the quantitative analysis and to offer further insight
into the findings presented in this Section.
5. BEYOND THE NUMBERS: A QUALITATIVE LOOK INTO THE
DECISIONS
In order to provide an account of how courts went about
maintaining their judicial discretion, this Section conducts a qualitative investigation of the decisions, focusing on areas of judicial
decision-making in which courts still have a say after the Amendment. For this purpose, the Study identified several recurrent
themes that reflect “pockets” of discretion in court decisions: interpretation of the term “Combat Action” and the weight given to
sovereign immunity after the Amendment; use of costs orders and
exgratia compensation; and implications of plaintiffs’ involvement
in the events that led to their injuries. While these themes pull in
different directions on the proState versus proplaintiff continuum, they share an important feature: They enable courts to determine how to decide the claims, instead of yielding to the Knesset’s
dictation. Since the law does not provide a clear legal framework
with regard to these issues, further investigation is required to assert the way in which these tools were applied. As detailed below,
the findings discovered in the examination generally support patterns revealed in the previous Section.
5.1. The Core: Interpretation and Implementation of Sovereign
Immunity
5.1.1. Interpretation of the Term “Combat Action” After the
Amendment
For some time after the 2002 Amendment was enacted, courts
struggled with the interpretation of the new definition to the term
“Combat Action.” In this context, it is important to look at the “in-
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termediate cases”; that is, cases (N=60) in which the claim was filed
before the Amendment came into force, but the decision was rendered after it took effect. Since the Amendment did not explicitly
provide a commencement date for the definition of “Combat Action,” the question of whether to apply it to these cases was left to
courts’ discretion. This resulted in courts providing varied interpretations of the legal framework that applies to such claims. The
language used in these opinions is telling as to judges’ willingness
(or reluctance) to accept the implications of the Amendmentand
more importantly their insistence on maintaining their discretion.
The most surprising and important finding was the fact that in
over half of the intermediate cases, which represent thirty-two cases, courts chose not to mention the 2002 Amendment, i.e., they either
adjudicated the case based on precedents which interpreted the
term “Combat Action,”91 or decided it without referring to the issue of sovereign immunity.92 Furthermore, in eight additional cases, courts specifically referred to the Amendment but stated that it
does not control the case, since the event in question took place before the Amendment was enacted.93 This means that in two-thirds
of the intermediate cases courts did not apply the newly enacted
Amendment to the case before them.94
In contrast, in only fourteen cases courts specifically referred to
the application of the Amendment. Even then, this was done for
See, e.g., CA 5964/92 Beni Uda v. The State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.)
(in Hebrew) (deciding the interpretation of “Combat Action” prior to Amendment).
92 In five (5) additional cases, which were not included in the thirty-two (32)
cases mentioned, the courts ruled based on the statute of limitations and did not
refer to sovereign immunity.
93
However, in one of these cases the Jerusalem Magistrate Court held that
although the 2002 Amendment did not apply to the case in question, it did reflect
the original legislative intent regarding the term “Combat Action” should be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of the Amendment: “To complete the picture it should be noted that the current definition of the term “Combat Action” in
the Act is very broad and it considerably limits the number of cases where victims
will be entitled to damages from the State. Although this definition does not apply to the case at hand, it might point to the original intent of the legislature with
regard to the term ‘Combat Action.’” CC (Jerusalem) 15600/01 Amin v. The State
of Israel (2006) (Isr.).
94 Interestingly, looking only at the cases in which courts ruled for plaintiffs,
in all but one case the courts either stated that the Amendment did not apply to
the case or did not mention it at all. In only one case the court held that the act
does not constitute a “Combat Action” according to the definition provided by the
Amendment.
91
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the purpose of minimizing its relevance. In two cases, the courts
explicitly contended that the Amendment had not generated a
dramatic change with regard to the scope of the term “Combat Action” and attempted to align the definition added by the Amendment with the interpretation of the term in prior cases.95
The fact that in most intermediate casesin which courts still
had leeway on whether to implement the Amendmentthey opted for not doing so, might teach us something about the relationship between the courts and the legislature. It suggests that judges
preferred maintaining their flexibility in interpreting the term
“Combat Action” to applying the definition dictated by the Knesset in the 2002 Amendment. This way, they were left with more
latitude for adjudicating the claims as they saw fit.
5.1.2. Weighting Sovereign Immunity in “After the Amendment”
Decisions
Another way for courts to preserve their discretion was to give
sovereign immunity limited weight in their decisions. This was
done by reserving the use of immunity as a sole factor to extreme
cases, on the one hand, and by relying on additional considerations
in explaining the bulk of the decisions, on the other hand.
Cases after the Amendment, in which courts ruled solely based
on sovereign immunity, accounted for only 9% of the cases favorable to the State. Interestingly, delving into the facts of these cases,96
the events in question were either an extensive military operation,
a targeted killing, or some other form of full-fledged military activity. None of them were anti-terrorism acts as suggested by the
new definition of “Combat Action” set forth by the Amendment.
95
See CC (Haifa) 305/95 Samudi v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.) (finding
for plaintiff); see also CDC (Haifa) 1081-04 Zagier v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.)
(alterations in original) (“[I]n my opinion, the fact that the event in question took
place four months before Amendment (No. 4) [the 2002 Amendment] came into
force does not change the conclusion that ‘targeted killing’ constitutes a ‘Combat
Action,’ both according to the current definition of the term in the Act and according to the courts’ jurisprudence.”). Similar interpretations were offered in cases
brought and decided after the Amendment. See, e.g., CC (Kfar Saba) 5305/04 Bahar v. The State of Israel (2007) (Isr.) (finding for the State).
96 Except for two cases, in which the claims were dismissed due to the “Conflict Zones” exception, included in the 2005 Amendment, which was later invalidated by the HCJ.
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For example, in one of the cases the Haifa District Court adjudicated a claim filed by the estate and dependents of a man and his two
wives who were killed during Operation “Defensive Shield.”97
Courts thus seemed to reserve the “trump card” of sovereign immunity for extreme cases of IDF operations. This further supports
the notion that courts were reluctant to accept the limitation of
their discretion through the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, courts continued to engage
in factual and legal discussions examining IDF potential liability,
rather than relying solely on sovereign immunity in dismissing the
case. After the Amendment, the issue of sovereign immunity became significantly more prevalent in parties’ arguments and
courts’ reasoning,98 but courts tended to include this consideration
as an additional component rather than a main ground for dismissal. Various types of rhetoric were used to incorporate other justifications besides sovereign immunity as part of the reasoning.99
The issue of sovereign immunity at times played the lead role in
the reasoning, whereas additional discussions, either factual, legal
or both, fulfilled a minor, supplementary function. For example, in
Tsabarna, the Court decided the case on the basis of sovereign immunity, but added the following remark:
“Beyond necessary, I shall add that it was not established that
the defendant is liable based on the law of torts. . . . [T]he
plaintiff has failed to establish facts vital for proving his
case.”100
97 CDC (Haifa) 679-04 The Estate of Hardan v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.)
The Court’s opinion was only three pages long.
98 See supra Section 3.2.
99
This may indicate discomfort with establishing an unfavorable outcome
for plaintiffs solely based on sovereign immunity on the one hand, and reluctance
to interpret the Act too loosely on the other. The fact that these are trial courts
subject to review by an appellate court may play a role. Magistrate and district
court judges, particularly those with aspirations to be promoted to a higher instance, might avoid “creative” interpretations which will be at risk of being overturned by an appellate court. However, judges might also consider this an opportunity to express more judicial “courage,” which could win them credit with more
senior judges.
100 CDC (Jerusalem) 6506/04 Tsabarna v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (emphasis added). A similar trend was detected in magistrate courts’ decisions. See,
e.g., CC (Nazareth) 1253/02 Omar v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (holding that:
“[I]t is not without hesitation that I have reached the conclusion that the action
conducted by the security forces constitutes a “Combat Action” and so the State is
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In other cases, factual issues or legal questions of liability
were the primary components of the reasoning, and were supplemented by immunity as a secondary justification for the outcome,
usually gaining only a brief reference. For instance, in Taisir the
Court noted:
“[T]he discussion could have ended at this point, as the
burden to prove the circumstances of his injury is on the
plaintiff. . . . [T]he claim should also be denied since the defendant met the burden to show the shooting was conducted in circumstances which justify immunity due to ‘Combat
Action.’”101
A more radical approach was offered by the Haifa District
Court, which noted that sovereign immunity might be revoked in
extreme cases of unreasonable or disproportional IDF action.102 No
decision has gone so far as implementing this approach. In fact,
some of the judges expressed an inclination in favor of the State
and an adherence to the anti-plaintiff approach embodied in the
Amendment. Nevertheless, the vast majority of decisions did
share this important feature: the judges did not solely examine
sovereign immunity. Rather, they delved into the specific facts of
the case and/or the substantive legal questions it raised. Once
again, we witness courts’ unwillingness to comply with the legislature’s attempt to limit their discretion to the issue of immunity and
preclude judicial scrutiny of IDF actions.

exempted from liability in accordance with the Act, even if its soldiers had been
negligent. However, if I am mistaken in this conclusion, I still believe the claim
should be denied, since the soldiers’ shooting was lawful and aimed at stopping
the plaintiffs who were at the time suspected of planning a terrorist attack on Israel.”).
101 CDC (Haifa) 585/06 Taisir v. The State of Israel (2010) (Isr.); see also CDC
(Jerusalem) 3125/01 The Estate of Aliwa v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (discussing at length factual and liability questions, and then adding a brief reference to
sovereign immunity), and CC (Jerusalem) 6160/04 Arar v. The State of Israel
(2010) (Isr.) (conducting a comprehensive factual discussion and holding that the
plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof required to establish his case and that
the claim is also subject to sovereign immunity due to “Combat Action”).
102 The Court discussed the claim of a ten-year-old who suffered substantial
injuries as a result of an operation in the city of Hebron. The Court held that it
leaves this question unanswered, as the IDF’s conduct had been reasonable. Zagier, supra note 95.
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5.1.3. Favorable Outcomes Towards Plaintiffs After the
Amendment: How?
Another area, which demonstrates the courts’ endeavor to
maintain their discretionary power, can be found in cases where
plaintiffs won after the Amendment. As noted, even after the 2002
Amendment and the expansion of sovereign immunity it brought
about, courts were still able to find for plaintiffs in a non-negligible
group of cases. This prompts a closer look at these cases to tease
out the methods used by courts in overcoming the sovereign immunity bar.103
One approach identified through the analysis of these cases is
narrow interpretation. That is, reading the term “Combat Action” so
that it does not apply to cases of routine military activity. Unlike
other trends, this approach distinctly favors plaintiffs. An example
is the case of Abu Samra, in which the Haifa District Court adjudicated a claim brought after the death of a couple and their 5-yearold son. The three family members were killed while picking vine
leaves in a field near the Palestinian city of Jenin as a result of a
shooting during an IDF road-opening mission. The Court discussed the liability of the soldiers, as well as the question of immunity, and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.104 The Court’s interpretative approach105 might have been inspired by the trying
circumstances of the case, particularly the fact that the victims were
clearly innocent bystanders.106
A different approach, one of disregard, is seen in a case adjudicated by the Jerusalem District Court and characterized by no
103 It should be noted that some cases resulted in a favorable outcome with
the State’s consent. See, e.g., CC (Jerusalem) 9174/04 Daraweesh v. The State of
Israel (2007) (Isr.), and CC (Jerusalem) 2512/03 Saliman v. The State of Israel (2005)
(Isr.).
104
See CDC (Haifa) 420/04 The Estate of Abu Samra v. The State of Israel
(2011) (Isr.). See also CDC (Haifa) 661/99 Alwahidi v. The State of Israel (2006)
(Isr.).
105 This approach significantly departed from interpretations given to similar
situations in other cases. See, e.g., Hamarsha, supra note 66.
106
A similar impression arose from the interview with Adv. Abu-Hussein,
who represented the estates of the victims and their dependents in that case; Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012).
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less unfortunate circumstances. In the case of Aramin, an 11-yearold girl on her way back from school died from a rubber bullet shot
by Military Police Corps soldiers, which caused a severe head injury. The Court comprehensively reviewed the evidence of the case
and concluded that the soldiers were negligent in conducting the
shooting. It did not mention the issue of sovereign immunity.107
Although this approach was used to a lesser extent than the narrow interpretation approach,108 it suggests that in some cases,
courts may disregard sovereign immunity altogether.109
These cases suggest that even after the 2002 Amendment courts
still had sufficient leeway to find for plaintiffs in certain cases,
should they decide to do so. This leeway stems from judges’ tendency to review cases on the merits, even in instances of “Combat
Action,” and to rarely rest the reasoning solely on immunity. This
allowed courts to maintain their discretion despite the sovereign
immunity limitation and enabled some courts to rule in favor of
plaintiffs when they deemed it justifiable.110
5.2. Courts’ “Final Word”: Costs and Ex-gratia Compensation
Two particular elements in the decisions showed interesting
See CDC (Jerusalem) 9334/07 The Estate of Aramin v. The Ministry of Defense (2010) (Isr.).
108
A similar approach was taken in the case of Zidan, which revolved
around a reconnaissance mission of military vehicles that went wrong when the
soldiers suspected that a car driving on the road contained a bomb. It was later
discovered that the passengers of the car were three women, Israeli residents, on
their way to visit a relative in the OPT. Although the Court did not find the soldiers were negligent, it ruled for the plaintiffs based on “considerations of justice
and equal distribution of social burdens.” CDC (Haifa) 752/04 The Estate of Zidan v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.)
109
This may also be connected to the seniority and status of the presiding
judge. The case of Aramin was decided by Judge Ef’al-Gabai, who is a senior
judge in the Jerusalem District Court. Supra, note 107.
110 Adv. Abu-Hussein reflected a similar perception of the courts’ approach,
focusing on the identity of the judge sitting on the bench. Interview with Adv.
Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). The same impression was manifested by
Adv. Hleihil, and regarding judges’ approach to the cases she noted that: “It
mainly depends on the particular judge. Some believe these cases do not stand a
chance while others are willing to find for plaintiffs in certain cases. However, the
general approach is very much against these claims.” Interview with Adv. Gada
Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013).
107
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and surprising trends in the quantitative analysis: litigation costs
orders and the recommendation to pay ex-gratia compensation. A
common feature to both these issues is their inclusion in the final
part of the decision, usually accompanied by the personal impression of the judge from the case. This discretionary area provides us
with a window of sorts into judges’ state of mind in adjudicating
the cases.
5.2.1. Courts’ Rhetoric Regarding Costs Orders
As mentioned, in a substantial group of cases, courts did not
issue a costs order against losing plaintiffs. These cases were typically related to bodily injuries rather than property damages. Beyond this consideration, the research found three recurring patterns used to justify a decision not to order plaintiffs to pay costs,
often applied in tandem.111
First, the young age of plaintiffs was repeatedly used as a reason
not to order costs, underscoring the loss of future opportunities for
the victim. Courts used statements such as, “the plaintiff was a
young man, 20 years old at the time of the event,”112 or, “in this
tragic case, a young boy was injured,”113 in justifying their avoidance from issuing costs orders.
Second, courts tended to emphasize the severity of the injury
sustained by plaintiffs or the gravity of their condition as grounds
not to order costs. Courts mentioned justifications such as, “considering the severe injury sustained by the plaintiff, there is no order for costs”114 or, “given the circumstances and considering the
111
In addition, a fourth class of decisions did not provide specific justifications for the decisions and simply mentioned that the court is refraining from giving an order for costs “under the circumstances” or due to “considerations of justice.” See CC (Nazareth) 5450/05 Najam v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.)
(dismissing the case on the basis of statute of limitations). See also CC (Jerusalem)
6348/04 Sa’ada v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (dismissing the case based on
lack of liability on the part of the State and sovereign immunity, but suggesting
that the State should consider paying ex-gratia compensation).
112
CC (Nazareth) 6778/07 Abu-Tabich v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.)
(mentioning the serious orthopedic disability the plaintiff sustained as justification). See also CC (Nazareth) 07/731 The Estate of Skafi v. The State of Israel (2009)
(Isr.).
113 CC (Jerusalem) 2347/04 Abu-Juda v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (also
noting that the plaintiff was an innocent bystander, who was uninvolved in the
event).
114 See CC (Haifa) 1044/98 Alshaid v. The Military Commander in the Gaza
Strip (2002) (Isr.).
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serious injury of the plaintiff as a result of the shooting, I refrain
from ordering legal expenses and attorney’s fees.”115
Third, as elaborated below, a reference to plaintiffs’ noninvolvement in the events (that is, the fact that they were merely innocent bystanders injured by no fault of their own) was also used
as a reason not to order costs.116
It seems that judges’ rhetoric in decisions rendered both before and after the Amendment supports the assumption that courts
feel discomfort when they find for the State in certain claims, particularly when they pertain to young, severely injured, and innocent bystander plaintiffs, or any combination of the three characteristics. Although courts usually found for the State after the
Amendment, they often used their broad discretion on litigation
costs as a platform to express their personal impression of the case
and its tragic circumstances.
5.2.2. Courts’ Rhetoric Regarding Ex-gratia Compensation
The topic of ex-gratia compensation revealed ambiguous trends
in the quantitative analysis. It is thus interesting to look at the language the courts chose to use in referring to this issue.
First, cases in which courts recommended ex-gratia compensation were characterized by particularly difficult circumstances. In
some,117 the judges explicitly underscored the nature of the circumstances in the recommendation to grant ex-gratia payments. For instance, in Elmatsri, the Court stated: “Unfortunately, the plaintiff
115 CC (Nazareth) 5682/01 Yusuf v. The State of Israel (2006) (Isr.). For additional examples, see CC (Jerusalem) 4130/02 Razam v. The State of Israel (2006)
(Isr.) (holding that: “In light of the plaintiff’s injury, I do not see fit to order him to
pay costs.”); CC (Haifa) 6144/04 Faiz v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.); CC (Jerusalem) 9188/04 Manasara v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.); CC (Nazareth) 1558/08
Almakus v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.); CC (Jerusalem) 98/20790 Issa v. The
State of Israel (2005) (Isr.).
116
See CC (Haifa) 4066/02 The Estate of Abad v. The State of Israel (2012)
(Isr.). See also CC (Haifa) 1287/94 Hatib v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.); CC (TelAviv) 4066/02 The Estate of Abu-Zahara v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) (dismissing a case brought by a bystander Palestinian journalist from the Palestinian
city of Jenin based on sovereign immunity and the fact that the plaintiffs did not
meet the burden of proof for showing that the injury was caused by IDF shooting); CC (Jerusalem) 01/5503 Abu-Atsi v. The State of Israel (2003) (Isr.).
117 This was the case in a total of six (6) cases.
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was injured with no fault of his own . . . Although the remedy for
the plaintiff cannot be found within the law of torts, the State
would do right if it would consider ex-gratia compensation.”118 In
other cases, courts suggested that the State should offer compensation, without indicating in the judgment the specific circumstances
which justified it, or by referring only to the outcome of the case.119
Similarly, this issue was introduced in one case following the dismissal of the claim based on the statute of limitations.120
Second, although only two decisions expressed a negative view
of ex-gratia payments, they are important in potentially explaining,
at least in part, the lesser tendency to suggest ex-gratia compensation after the Amendment. In this context, the Be’er-Sheva District
Court noted:
“Giving compensation or an exemption from the usual order for costs “ex-gratia” constitutes a differential endowment not in accordance with the equal criteria set forth by
the legislature. . . . Such appropriation contrasts both with
the principle of legality and with the principle of equality.”121
While recommendations for ex-gratia compensation are applied to a lesser extent by courts than the avoidance of costs orders,
and prompt various views among judges, they still constitute a
space for some judges to express their discomfort with the outcome
they reached and to protect their judicial discretion in the face of
the legislature’s attempts to limit it.

118 CC (Jerusalem) 9244/07 Elmatsri v. The State of Israel (2012) (Isr.). See also
Sa’ada, supra note 111; CC (Haifa) 09-01-17063 The Estate of Zalt v. The State of Israel (2012) (Isr.) (mentioning that there was no dispute regarding the fact that the
plaintiff had died as a result of IDF shooting although she was an innocent bystander, and suggesting it would be appropriate if the State compensated the victim’s family at least partially).
119 See Hamarsha, supra note 66.
120
See CC (Nazareth) 7997/97 Abahara v. The State of Israel (2002) (Isr.).
This statement is interesting since as we witnessed in Section 4, supra, the State
has used the statute of limitations in these claims much more frequently in the
decade between 2002 and 2012, in the wake of the Amendment, which shortened
the limitations period from seven to two years.
121
CC (Beit Shemesh) 5193/08 Masari Gabon Ltd. v. The State of Israel
(2012) (Isr.). A similar approach was expressed by one of the interviewees, who
mentioned his unwillingness to cooperate with the Ex-Gratia Committee. Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012).
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5.3. Undefined Domain: Implications of Plaintiff Involvement in the
Incident for Remedy Eligibility
A final issue in which courts enjoy considerable discretion is
the implications of plaintiffs’ involvement in the events that led to
the claim, for instance, by throwing stones or otherwise confronting IDF soldiers ("plaintiff involvement"). Since the law does not
explicitly determine the consequences of plaintiff involvement in
the cases in question,122 courts used this vagueness as an additional
opportunity for asserting judicial discretion.
Before the Amendment, the courts treated plaintiff involvement flexibly by using the non-dichotomous concept of contributory negligence, which allows courts to determine various degrees of
involvement as a percentage from the overall liability. In contrast,
after the Amendment, we find a transition to a dichotomous approach, which views plaintiffs as either involved or uninvolved in
the hostilities. This transition was reflected in the quantitative account of the outcomes, showing that while before the Amendment,
involved plaintiffs were at times awarded damages, after the
Amendment this phenomenon has all but vanished.123 In accordance with this trend, the courts’ language has also changed, from
reflecting the level of plaintiff involvement as a percentage of the
overall liability,124 to merely determining whether the plaintiff was
involved. Courts’ treatment of uninvolved plaintiffs has also
changed after the Amendment, namely, a more favorable treatment towards uninvolved plaintiffs was identified before the
Amendment.
In contrast to these changes, the rhetoric of the decisions reflected a similar approach towards plaintiff involvement both before and after the Amendment. In relation to involved plaintiffs,
unsurprisingly, courts repeatedly uttered their negative perception
of them. For instance, in a decision given before the Amendment,
122
See Tort Ordinance, 1968, § 64 (as amended) (Isr.) (defining merely the
general term “contributory negligence," and omitting a specific reference to this
issue in the Act).
123
With the exception of two cases: See CC (Jerusalem) 1412/98 Hanan v.
The State of Israel (2003) (Isr.), and CC (Haifa) 643/99 Id v. The Military Commander (2006) (Isr.).
124 See, e.g., CC (Jerusalem) 1608/98 Natsha v. The State of Israel (2000) (Isr.)
(determining that the plaintiff took part in the event by throwing stones, but deciding to still award compensation, albeit reduced).
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the court remarked:
“In the basis of the decision whether to award damages to a
victim of IDF shooting in the territories [OPT – G.J.B.] is the
distinction between an innocent victim . . . and a casualty
injured while conducting a hostile and dangerous activity.
In the latter case, the public interest obliges courts to deny
the claim.”125
In decisions rendered after the Amendment, courts articulated
the same approach.126
Interestingly, though, at least in their rhetoric, courts expressed
a stringent approach towards innocent bystanders too, noting noninvolvement as irrelevant to establishing entitlement for damages.
For instance, in the case of Natser, decided before the Amendment,
the Jerusalem District Court noted that the fact that the plaintiff
might have been an innocent bystander does not in itself suggest
that he should be entitled for damages.127 The Kfar-Saba Magistrate Court pronounced an essentially identical view after the
Amendment.128
Hence, though the rhetoric of courts on plaintiff involvement
was consistent before and after the Amendment, the outcomes carried a difference in tone. This gap has become somewhat narrower
after the Amendment, yet the presence of the plaintiff involvement
factor has far from disappeared. This factor was apparent, as we
have seen, in cases in which judges ruled in favor of plaintiffs after
the Amendment. In such cases, judges based their decision in part
on plaintiffs being innocent bystanders to the events.129 Moreover,
as noted, in costs orders and ex-gratia compensation recommendations, courts were more benevolent towards uninvolved plaintiffs
after the Amendment. In light of these findings, it seems plaintiff
CC (Haifa) 1110/94 Sha’at v. The State of Israel (1998) (Isr.).
See CC (Haifa) 187/99 Halil v. The State of Israel (2007) (Isr.); CC (Haifa)
1008/98 Azuni v. The Military Commander in Judea and Samaria (2007) (Isr.).
127 See CDC (Jerusalem) 210/93 The Estate of Natser v. The State of Israel
(1995) (Isr.).
128 See CC (Tel-Aviv) 5305/04 The Estate of Bahar v. The State of Israel (2007)
(Isr.). See also CC (Nazareth) 1088/02 Sarhahn v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.).
129
See, e.g., CC (Afula) 3254/00 Naaman v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.)
(holding that: “I do not think the minor inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s version
change the fact that he was an innocent bystander injured with no fault of his own
and it should be noted that he was a 9-year-old boy at the time.”).
125
126
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involvement remains an influential factor used by courts to continue to exercise their discretion after the Amendment.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The back-and-forth dialogue (at times, more aptly described as
a battle) between courts and legislatures has been the subject of
abundant doctrinal and empirical scholarship over the years.
However, the literature on judiciary-legislature relations has focused predominantly on supreme courts. This Article expands the
current scholarship by examining a neglected domain: whether Israeli trial courts adjudicating sensitive political cases interact with
the legislature in a mode similar to the Israeli Supreme Court.
More specifically, the Study focused on the way courts respond to
a legislative change aimed at influencing their case law when adjudicating politically-charged cases.
The analysis of court decisions rendered in tort claims
brought by Palestinians against the State of Israel for damages sustained by IDF actions showed an interesting duality in the way trial courts dealt with an amendment to the governing law. On the
one hand, the analysis showed considerable compliance with the
requirements of the legislature as expressed by the 2002 Amendment and the anti-plaintiff approach the Amendment communicated. This was manifested most clearly by looking at the outcomes of cases: favorable outcomes for plaintiffs decreased
significantly following the Amendment, despite a simultaneous
rise in the number of claims and their severity. There was also a
growing trend of using sovereign immunity and statute of limitations considerations in the opinions. In this sense, the courts can
be understood as accommodating the public’s mindset regarding
the Conflict, as signified by the anti-plaintiff legislation. Per this
explanation, the courts acted passively, merely reflecting social attitudes as well as the interests of the political system.130
On the other hand, a deeper inquiry into the decisions, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, discovered attempts by the courts
to protect judicial discretion in the face of the legislative change.
Courts were willing to scrutinize IDF actions to a similar extent as
130

See Barzilai, supra note 46.
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they did before the Amendment, relegating the issue of immunity
to a secondary role in their decision-making. Courts maintained
“pockets” of discretion, regarding litigation costs orders, recommendations for ex-gratia compensation, and the weight given to
plaintiff involvement. These trends suggest a judicial attempt to
defend the institutional power and independence of the courts visà-vis the Knesset’s efforts to dictate its desired process.
In this respect, the research indicates that despite the focus
of previous literature on supreme courts, lower courts (at least
those that deal with sensitive political disputes) might be no less
inclined to interact with the legislature through statutory interpretation. Support for this courts-legislature dialogue can be found in
the recent legislation regarding state liability for IDF actions. As
noted, in 2012, an additional amendment to the Act was enacted.
Among other provisions, the 2012 Amendment explicitly obliges
courts to rule on sovereign immunity pleas prior to delving into
the specific facts of the case.131 The purpose of the 2012 Amendment seems obvious in light of this Study: to prevent courts from
examining IDF actions on the merits in cases where the military action constituted a “Combat Action,” and thus lowering the level of
military accountability before the courts. This may reflect a legislative response to courts' decision-making trends found in this
Study. The 2012 Amendment clearly shows that the legislature is
trying to confine judicial discretion in the claims to the simple application of “Combat Action” immunity.
However, follow-up research indicates132 that since the 2012
Amendment was promulgated, the courts’ approach towards the
claims has begun to converge with the legislator’s. The dwindling
number of cases in which courts find for plaintiffs,133 and the
overwhelming procedural requirements strictly enforced by the
131
Civil Torts Act, 2012 §§ 2(2) (as amended) (Isr.) (explaining that: “If the
State argued as a preliminary argument that it is not liable for the act in question
since it constitutes a Combat Action under subsection (a), the court shall consider
the argument immediately, and if found that the act was a Combat Action as
aforesaid, reject the claim.”).
132
See Bachar, supra note 24 (noting the change in Israeli courts' approach
towards the claims in question, evident in the willingness to adopt the State's use
of procedure to block claims from being adjudicated on the merits).
133 See Report in Response to a Freedom of Information (FOIA) Query to the
MOD (in Hebrew), (Aug. 3, 2015) http://bit.ly/2a982nf [https://perma.cc/6SUC7RMM]; Report in Response to MOD FOIA Query (Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with author).
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courts on Palestinian plaintiffs bringing tort claims against the
State,134 seem to suggest that the courts are beginning to line up
with the Knesset’s anti-plaintiff approach towards these claims.
One question which arises from this Study is why courts acted
as they did in adjudicating the claims following the 2002 Amendment. Was it a matter of protecting their institutional status, as the
neo-institutional approach would argue, or was it judges’ personal
desire to promote certain values, as other attitudinal models posit?
In politically-charged cases, it is difficult to contend that judges’
own values would be irrelevant. The courts are undoubtedly affected to some extent by judges' personal views regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Yet, in what way does the surrounding
reality affect them? Unlike Mautner, who sees the judiciary as representing elite groups who hold liberal values,135 this Article suggests a more complex picture by which values pull in different directions on the pro-State versus pro-plaintiff continuum, either
criticizing IDF actions that violate Palestinians’ human rights, or
underscoring Israel’s right to defend itself and thus justifying IDF
conduct. It seems likely that the political identity of the judge sitting on the bench influences both the rhetoric and outcome of a
case.136
Still, overall, and whatever their underlying motives, this Article showed that the judges’ behavior allowed them to maintain
their role in scrutinizing IDF conduct in the OPT. As a result of
this oversight, the State was repeatedly required to present evidence regarding the details of military actions in the OPT resulting
in injuries or property damage to Palestinians, thus promoting IDF
accountability despite the tendency to rule in the State’s favor.
Moreover, as we have seen, some judges found for plaintiffs in certain cases, even after the Amendment, and signaled the State that it
134 See Bachar, supra note 24 (describing the categories of procedural barriers
blocking Palestinians’ claims).
135 See MAUTNER, supra note 47.
136 The following quote from one of the interviews reflects the potential impact of judges’ personal values and political views on the outcome of the case, at
least in the eyes of the lawyers bringing the cases: “I believe that in the end of the
day we are dealing with human beings and regardless of this [the Conflict] judges
always go through an internal dialogue with themselves. Eventually, judges are
human beings as well; some of them may be more sensitive; some are Arabs and
see plaintiffs as regular people; some may be racist. The system has all kinds of
judges. The judge you end up with has a lot of influence on how your case turns
out.” Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012).
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should acknowledge its wrongdoing in still other cases. Nevertheless, perhaps due to judges’ concern of appellate court overturn, of
legislative override, or of other counter-reactions that would impair their institutional autonomy,137 this was done quite rarely.
More often, courts employed subtle ways of intervening in the legislature’s policy, employing their reasoning and other discretionary
tools to this end.
The remaining question is whether the courts were doing everything in their power, considering the hand they were dealt, to
maintain their independence and some measure of judicial monitoring of IDF actions. While the separation of powers demands
that political priorities be determined by the legislature, judicial
independence is crucial to make sure that the outcomes of cases are
not simply dictated by the powers-that-be. This is especially true
for those disputes in which the authorities themselves are implicated. However, while Edelman speaks to the high value placed on
the independence of civil courts by Israeli society,138 recent years
have seen a decline in the Israeli public’s regard towards the
courts.139 This trend may well impact the capacity of courts, both
on the lower levels and on the Supreme Court level, to push back
against restrictive legislation like the 2002 and 2012 Amendments.
Indeed, the continuous state of conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians requires all courts, not only the Supreme Court, to assume a difficult role: striking a delicate balance between drawing
the boundaries of state liability for IDF actions according to the
confines imposed by the legislation, and ensuring the State accepts
responsibility in adequate cases, thereby exercising a more lenient
approach towards plaintiffs when appropriate. This balance demands caution on the part of courts. It requires a firm insistence
on an independent judicial system, in order to serve as guardians
of human rights values. In this respect, recent trends showing a
137 See Dotan, supra note 49 (commenting on the Supreme Court’s conduct in
this respect).
138 EDELMAN, supra note 60, at 11 (noting that the civil judiciary is seen as the
institutional repository of the values that Israelis place on independent, objective,
and impartial decision-making).
139 In a general survey conducted in 2015, only 30% of the public expressed
full trust in the Israeli justice system. Hen Ma’anit, Survey: All Time Low in the
Public Trust in the Legal System, the Parliament and the Police, GLOBES (2015) (Isl.) (in
Hebrew), http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001076264 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y78P-H6QB].
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stringent approach among courts towards Palestinian plaintiffs are
cause for concern. These trends should be further investigated in
future studies.
This Study was a first attempt to systematically analyze data
and derive insights on tort lawsuits brought by Palestinians against
the State of Israel in the context of the Conflict. However, much
more research is still needed. Research already underway looks at
the use of procedural tools to restrict Palestinians’ access to Israeli
civil courts.140 Additional work examines the legal actors who
bring the claims and their impact on the litigation.141 Future research should explore the way Palestinian victims perceive their
injuries and the remedies for them, as well as their impressions of
Israeli court proceedings. This may help illuminate the potential
value of such litigation on a broader level, namely whether it can
play a role in the resolution of the Conflict. Furthermore, future
work should compare the Israeli-Palestinian mechanism to other
tools for compensating victims of armed conflict, in order to better
assess the mechanism in question. Hopefully, the findings described in this Article will help pave the way for such future research.

Bachar, supra note 24.
Gilat Bachar, When Lawyers Go to War: A Study of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Palestinians’ Tort Claims against Israel (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (analyzing the motivations and practices engaged in by lawyers in
the context of using tort law to affect social change or mobilize a movement).
140
141
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